The UK Parliament in recent decades has seen significant structural and behavioural changes that have rendered it more effective in carrying out its core functions than at any time in modern political history.
Introduction
The thesis of this article is straightforward. For the UK Parliament, these are the best of times, these are the worst of times. They are the best of times in its relationship to the executive. They are the worst of times, certainly the worst of times in contemporary history, in its relationship to the public. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Parliamentary affairs following peer review. The version of record, Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 70, Issue 2, 1 April 2017, Pages 191-206 , is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsw031
Students of politics have tended to focus on Parliament in terms of its relationship to the executive and not on its relationship to the people. In its relationship to the executive, there is good news to report. Both Houses have become more confident and more able in fulfilling their core functions of scrutiny and calling government to account. The extent to which this has occurred is not fully recognised. Both Houses have undergone substantial change, making Parliament as effective as it has ever been since the passage of the Second Reform Act in 1867. That is not to say that it has reached an ideal state -there is more than can, and should, be done -but it is in a better state than it has been for more than 150 years.
The situation is different in its relationship to the people. Enoch Powell observed that the House of Commons is the body through which the people, through their representatives, speak to the government, and the body through which government speaks to the people. That core, pivotal -and exclusive -role, for no other body can fulfil it, becomes even more important as decisions are seen as being taken further and further away from the people. The more that happens the more important it is that people have a voice through their parliament.
Yet what we are witnessing is a situation where both Houses are subject to negative coverage and public dissatisfaction. Resources are devoted to educating people about the institution, but not necessarily to defending it from scandal and a constant barrage of criticism. There has tended to be what may be characterised as a 'tin hats' mentality, sheltering in the bunker and trying to escape the barrage of media missiles.
Parliament lacks the confidence and the resources to mount an effective counteroffensive. 
The Best of Times
Let me take the best of times, the relationship to the executive in the United Kingdom.
For the century after 1867, the House of Commons was essentially a chamberoriented, predictable body, accepting what was told to it by government. It is now a more committee-oriented, questioning, less predictable body, no longer willing to accept that government has a monopoly as an information supplier. It has also acquired a power that would have been unthinkable fifty years ago. The House of Lords has been transformed, reinventing itself as a chamber of scrutiny, especially legislative scrutiny, complementing the work of the House of Commons. Both
Houses are now among the busiest legislative chambers in the world.
MPs are far less biddable than they were. We have seen behavioural and institutional change on a remarkable scale. As Philip Cowley has variously observed, we still hear the occasional commentator bemoan the end of the era of the independent member.
The reality is that it has been the other way round. We have moved from what Sam Beer termed 'the Prussian discipline' of the 1950s and 1960s (Beer 1969, pp. 350-1) to an era when the whips cannot always guarantee the outcome of a vote (Norton 1975 , 1978 , 1980 , 1985 , Cowley 2002 , 2005 , Cowley and Norton 1999 , Cowley and Stuart 2012 . We retain high levels of cohesion, but nothing on the scale of fifty and sixty years ago.
The government not only does not control voting outcomes in the way that it once did, but also no longer exerts an iron grip on the parliamentary agenda. The House of Commons used to be an outlier among national legislative chambers in terms of the control exerted by government over the timetable (Saalfeld, 2000, p. 28) . Recent years have seen that grip significantly loosened. The government now is only one actor, albeit the most important, in determining the business of the House. The capacity to determine what is debated is shared with opposition parties, who select the topics on 20 Opposition Days. There is the independent capacity of Members to raise issues through ballot or the Speaker and through the greater willingness of the Speaker to grant urgent questions. We have had the creation of debates in Westminster Hall (Norton 2013, pp. 31-32, 115-17) , in essence a parallel chamber based on Australian experience, creating additional time for Members to raise issues of concern to them and elicit a government response.
It is a capacity shared with committees of the House. The seepage of agenda power to committees is relatively new, starting with the Liaison Committee, comprising the chairs of select committees, being empowered to choose the topics on three Estimates Days. We have had the establishment of the Backbench Business Committee (Norton 2013, pp. 32, 114) , with the power to determine business on 35 days (27 of them on the floor of the House). It selects topics proposed by Members, a good number of which the government may well have preferred not to be debated, such as prisoner voting rights, the war in Afghanistan, and a referendum on EU membership. The most recent addition is a Petitions Committee, which considers public petitions and can refer topics to other committees as well as undertake its own inquiries and Louise Thompson has shown, the committees have a greater impact than is apparent from the number of non-government amendments accepted (Thompson 2016, pp. 36-48 ; see also Thompson 2015) . This encompasses achieving changes to regulations and guidance and changes made by government after committee stage which can be attributed to the committee itself. As she writes:
If we quantify the impact of committee stage… on the basis of the number of amendments directly influenced by committee stage, we see the impact of bill committees much more prominently. Instead of being responsible for only 88 changes across the 2000-2010 period, it can be seen that in reality committee stage has prompted at least 1,900 changes to government legislation. (Thompson 2016, pp. 43-4) .
As she notes, this is confined to the House of Commons. If extended the Lords, the figures would be even higher.
Perhaps the most overlooked in terms of its sheer constitutional significance, is the extent to which the government is now constrained in the exercise of prerogative powers. The most significant change has been the development of the practice, amounting now in the view of some to a convention, that before the executive commits British forces to action abroad the consent of the House of Commons must be given (Norton 2015, pp. 177-9 (Straw, 2012, p. 375 It is more independent than the Commons in terms of its willingness to defeat the government, though not necessarily a House of more independent members. Peers are more loyal to the party whip than are MPs (Norton 2003, pp. 57-72) . However, the government is vulnerable to defeat as a result of opposition parties combining against it or, especially in the period of coalition government 2010-15, crossbench (that is, independent) peers voting in large numbers with the opposition. Because the government does not have an overall majority in the House, it has to take it seriously in order to get its measures through. That and the change in the nature of the membership generates a chamber characterised by the politics of justification, rather than the politics of assertion that characterises the House of Commons (Norton 2016b, p. 129) . Ministers have to engage with members. found that a majority of substantive government amendments (55 per cent) could be traced to amendments moved earlier by peers, with others attributable to reports from committees or pressure from MPs (Russell 2013, p. 173 ). The proportion is significant, but it is some of the individual changes achieved to bills that can be the most important aspect of the impact of the House of Lords. The House makes a difference to legislation, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.
The House has also followed the Commons in becoming more specialised through the use of committees and doing so in a way that complements committees in the Commons. In terms of investigate select committees, it has opted for committees that address cross-cutting issues and also committees that focus on secondary legislation.
Among the former, the Constitution Committee has proved especially significant, acting as a constitutional watchdog (LeSeuer and Simson Caird 2013, p. 281) . On the latter, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee examines the input side -the inclusion of order-making powers in a Bill -and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee examines the output side, looking at statutory instruments produced by government.
We also see collaboration between the chambers, with the Joint Committee on Human
Rights, which has helped raise the profile of human rights in both Houses (Hunt, Hooper and Yowell, 2012) , and occasional joint committees to engage in pre- has always been important in institutional terms (Norton 2013, pp. 6-7) , but it is far more significant in pluralist terms than critics realise. Yes, there is still some way to go. There remain major problems, not least -as Daniel Greenberg (2016) 
The Worst of Times
Let us now look at the other side. In its relationship with the public, Parliament is under challenge and in a way it has not been for more than a century. It is confronted by several challenges and by a collective lack of confidence in facing those challenges. My argument is that it needs to confront these challenges and to do so robustly.
In many respects, as a representative body, Parliament matters now more than ever The answer is not to be found so much in terms of result-based performance, but more what Green has characterised as the actor-based perspective (Green 2013, p. 418 ).
This was essentially my opening point in that students of politics have focused on the former and not on how politicians behave, or are seen or believed to behave, by the public. My contention is that it is not just a case of how politicians are seen, but that there is an increasing unwillingness to look at what they are doing.
There are three pressures external to Parliament. The first is popular cynicism.
People have long taken a critical attitude to politicians as such, but for much of the That has been compounded by the second development, which has reinforced the cynical tendency, but is a development independent of it. We have seen a less interested, and less informed, media. This is not the product of the cynicism, but of There has been the emergence of what has been termed e-expressives, who do follow and comment on politics, but who do not engage in political activity beyond the Internet (Cantijoch, 2014, pp. 69-72) . People often have views on public issues, but little incentive to do anything about them.
The open nature of the Internet has also enabled anybody with a view to publish it, with no quality control. As Ian Martin wrote in May 2016 in his last newsletter as editor of CapX: 'The concern is that people are encouraged to live in an anti-social media echo-chamber, in which they only hear views and conspiracy theories which confirm their prejudices' (Martin 2016) . Problems that we have traditionally associated with the press are writ large in terms of the Internet.
These developments come together. It is easy to take a cynical view, because it is both cheap and entails no serious research or reflection.
However, Parliament itself is part of the problem, both in terms of behaviour and attitude. There are two particular dimensions to this.
First, the very work of both Houses has an opportunity cost. Challenging the executive is necessary, but it is time consuming and takes place within a confined environment. Constituency work is more and more time consuming -impinging negatively on the collective work of Parliament -yet constitutes contact with a small minority of the electorate; there are lots of letters, and now, on an even more extensive scale, e-mails, but many are from the same people. Being, in the eyes of some, glorified social workers constitutes work that could be undertaken by other agencies and is at the expense of engaging with people on a wider scale. Pursuing the interests of individual constituents is not the same as pursuing constituency interests (Norton and Wood 1993) .
Second, and this is the point I wish to stress, there is a collective lack of confidence. This has got worse over time. It was apparent in the 1990s in the wake of the 'cash (Tinkler and Mehta 2016, p 14) . One felt that the impact on the public lack of trust in politicians was 'a blow that I don't think we will recover from in a lifetime' (Tinkler and Mehta 2016, p 14) .
The principal problem of the expenses' scandal was not in terms of public perceptions. As Nicholas Allen and Sarah Birch have shown, levels of trust in politicians were not much dented by the scandal and soon returned to pre-expenses' scandal level (Allen and Birch, 2014, pp. 132-52) . The problem was in terms of Members' self-confidence. Members were essentially shell-shocked by the revelations and coverage, day by day, accorded to them. This is not to say that there is not a problem of public perception of MPs. There is, but it is longstanding and has got worse over time. MPs have, as Matthew Flinders has argued, become a demonised group in the United Kingdom (Flinders 2012, pp. 1-17) . My point is that we need to recognise that there is a problem, but it is not one that has reached a new high as a result of the expenses' scandal. The lesson to be drawn from this is that a 'tin hats' mentality, hoping that the problem will go away, is not sufficient. The problem is more ingrained and requires more than a short-term response.
In so far as there has been a reaction, it has been defensive. New mechanisms have The relevance of this for our purposes is that there is no one individual who can claim to speak for Parliament. There is no equivalent of a company chair, someone who can speak for the institution, not least at times of crisis. There is no chief executive officer of Parliament and the chief executive officer of each House is not analogous to the CEO of a major corporation.
When there is a scandal, who can answer on behalf of the institution? When a crisis hits a company, there is usually the chairman and CEO available to act and to speak on behalf of the company (see Griffin 2014) . They may well be trained ready for such an occasion. It is best practice among leading companies. They know the need, first, to recognise that there is a crisis, and, second, to respond once that realisation occurs.
In Parliament, there are leadership positions in each House, there is some co-operation between the Houses, and there are press officers. However, the fact that there are leadership positions may itself be a problem rather than part of the solution, involving the need for contact and co-ordination, which take time, and possibly creating conflict or tension. Press officers can act quickly if authorised, but they cannot be the authoritative voice of the institution. The media look to the head of the organisation to respond. There is no such head as far as the legislature is concerned.
There is a case for Parliament addressing this problem, or addressing the need for What is required is a restoration of political confidence and a means of giving effect to it. Citizenship education has been introduced in the national curriculum for schools as a way of ensuring that people know about Parliament and its role. But we need a similar exercise within Parliament itself. MPs and peers -especially MPs -need to stand back from their daily routine to appreciate the role of the very institution of which they are members. They need then to go on the offensive.
Members need to recognise that it cannot be left to others. That does not mean that those in leadership positions cannot take a role -they can and should -but my point is that this by itself is not sufficient. Members have to come out of the bunker. They have to have the political will to do so as well as the resources, not least time and a better command of the means of reaching electors. We cannot proceed on the basis that everything I have outlined about the two Houses provides the tools to persuade the public that members of each House deserve their confidence. People need to trust parliamentarians and that will come when parliamentarians have confidence in themselves and are prepared to act to demonstrate that they are worthy of trust. My view is that Members are worthy of public trust -MPs and peers are generally hardworking, conscientious and able individuals -but that is not how others see them.
The media and the public are prone to generalise from an N of 1. We need to be able to deal with the one, but we need also to go beyond that. It is not easy. Members tend to be too defensive -that is at the heart of the problem -and unwilling to make changes to tackle the problem.
It is crucial to recognise that some of the criticism of each House is not without merit, and address such things as the appointment process to the House of Lords, but there is a need, a glaring need, for MPs and peers to provide a lead. Some members have shown leadership -they have confidence and have mastered the means of engaging with electors -so it can be done. But they need to be the norm, not the exception.
Members cannot shuffle off responsibility. They need to accept, indeed to embrace, it and to promote vigorously the institution of which they are members. This can be justified in terms of rational action theory in that it is in Members' own interests to promote the body of which they are members and which sustains them. This does not detract from the adversarial debate that characterises the Commons. Members should be seen to be challenging and questioning, but they need also to recognise that they constitute the buckle between electors and government. They need to be more outward facing.
That challenge is even greater in the light of recent events. As I said in a debate in the House of Lords on the outcome of the June 2016 EU referendum, the campaign demonstrated Downs' economic theory of democracy (Downs 1957) , each side seeking to outbid the other, raising expectations that were not likely to be met, whichever side won:
This creates a problem of trust in our political system and indeed in our institutions. Government has responsibility for negotiating withdrawal, but Parliament has a crucial role of scrutiny and of linkage between government and people. We have to inform, but it is a two-way process. We have to try to ensure that the gap between expectations and what can be delivered is narrowed. (HL Deb. 6 July 2016 , col. 2087 That is a fundamental challenge.
Conclusion
I conclude by summarising my points. First, parliamentarians need to adopt a more outward looking approach and address the relationship between members and the public, not simply at the reactive and micro level of constituency casework, but at the broader macro level, addressing how citizens see the behaviour of parliamentarians.
Second, how the public views politicians has become more negative over time and is not the product of recent specific scandals, though these may have, in the short term, exacerbated public perceptions. Third, the views of the public derive from broader societal and technological changes and these create major problems for parliamentarians, both in attracting attention and in affecting how the public view them. Fourthly, insofar as parliamentarians can make a difference, it is not by ignoring the changes and hoping that over time negative public perceptions will dissipate. Parliamentarians cannot look to others to solve the problem of public perception for them. Parliamentary education and outreach can have some impact on citizenship education -a long-term solution -but in the immediate future it rests with parliamentarians to challenge and to engage. What is needed at a minimum is to meet public expectations in terms of conveying a sense of public service. There was some public recognition of that service in the wake of the murder in June 2016 of Jo Cox, the MP for Batley and Spen, but that awareness needs to be nurtured and embedded.
Parliamentarians need to convey that they are listening and providing that Powellian link between people and government.
Identifying what needs to be done is one thing, achieving it is another. As already argued, in crisis management, the first essential step is to realise that there is a crisis.
What Parliament faces may not be a crisis, at least not on the scale faced by the US Congress, but it is a serious problem that needs to be faced. Unless it is faced, it may well become a crisis. My task in this article has been to establish the first but not the only step in what needs to be done. These need not be the worst of times. It is essential for MPs and peers to ensure that they are not.
